Introduction
Compliance achievement and assurance of processes and services with regulatory requirements, standards, regulations and business requirements becomes an actual task that should be resolved already in the stage of information systems' design and implementation. If the particular business process or business service is supported with an IT system, then the compliance assurance relates also to these supporting systems.
State of the art approach to the compliance achievement and assurance
The standard approach to achievement and assurance of compliance stands on the four steps of the proven Deming Cycle for continual improvement (Plan-Do-Check-Act).
"Plan" includes the risk analysis related to the particular business process, then formulation of the control objectives, design of the controls (i.e. the measurements leading to achievement of the control objectives) for compliance achievement including creation of compliance indicators.
"Do" represent the implementation of the designed controls. This implementation is usually composed of certain changes of the business process itself, as well as changes of the supporting IT systems. Also the metrics for measuring of compliance indicators' values are implemented in parallel with the controls' implementation.
"Check" is the phase of the business process monitoring and of the measuring effectiveness and correctness of the implemented controls. Within this step the measured values of metrics are evaluated and the compliance indicators' values are calculated.
"Act" constitutes the actions taken for compliance improvement. This phase results from the outputs of the previous steps and its own result is a set of proposals for improvement. These proposals then become an input for the next iteration of continual improvement cycle.
Compliance achievement and assurance in the legacy systems is usually very much financially expensive and time consuming, and moreover it is not flexible. Implementation of a control or just a change in its parameters mainly represents not only reconfiguration, but also changes in the source codes of the related supporting IT applications. In addition to that the implementation of the respective metrics is often very much demanding. In some cases it is even cancelled from financial or capacity reasons what significantly reduces the possibility to evaluate the correctness and effectiveness of the implemented control.
Concept of compliance assurance in SOA systems
The concept of service oriented architecture (SOA) among other approaches represents a set of principles for information systems design and integration (Rosen, Lublinsky, Smith & Balcer, 2008) . Three key principles of SOA are presented (Voříšek J. et al, 2008) . The first principle says: "business processes control the services and the services control the technologies what means that services represent an abstract layer creating the relationship between business processes and applications resp. technologies.". The second principle is: "business agility is representing the IT/ICT ability to flexibly respond to the business requirements' changes." And the third principle: "SOA is instantly developing, i.e. the SOA Governance".
These definitions nicely explain why SOA concept is closely interconnected with the concept of the business process management (BPM). At present these two concepts are applied accordingly. This conjunction brings great advantage into planning and management of IT services to achieve the best support for business processes. Also from the perspective of the flexibility of IT services SOA concept utilization is advantageous because it enables flexible response to the changes in business requirements. Interlinking SOA and BPM facilitates effective monitoring of the entire system.
In 2007 the authors of MASTER project proposal built their concept of assurance of the systems' compliance with regulatory requirements and with requirements arisen from the risk analysis on the SOA principles. One of the presumptions was that in the frame of SOA concept a set of design patterns for implementation and monitoring of selection of controls can be developed to achieve automated compliance monitoring and assessment. This expectation was verified within three years of the research and development.
Conjunction of business processes and their business objectives with the respective control objectives and the controls is depicted on the figure 1 "Implementation of regulatory requirements and compliance assessment in SOA systems" used for Fanta (Sabatova, Svojanovsky, Pigout, Worledge & Micheletti, 2009) . Each business process is designed and realized for certain purpose and concrete outputs of such process are expected, resp. the business goals of the process are defined. IT services in SOA represent the IT support for business services called within the business process flow. These services are designed and developed in the form enabling their easily sharing by other business services and by business processes.
The services in SOA are called and intermediated by means of Enterprise Service Bus (ESB). This principle can be advantageously used for compliance achievement and assurance. On the ESB we can observe when and with which parameters the services are called. We also can build an infrastructure directly interconnected with the ESB that continuously monitors the processes and at certain conditions this infrastructure changes or interrupts particular process instance. For instance such infrastructure starts a control process based on the evaluation of the observed process.
Also the technical realization of signaling, monitoring and enforcement infrastructure is based on the ESB events observation. The author's task was design of a Compliance Analyzer for this complex system. It required finding a way to compare the events of individual process instances captured by the signaling and monitoring infrastructure over ESB with the defined policy expressing compliance with a particular regulatory requirement. It was necessary to harmonize the process and the supporting IT services design with the signaling and monitoring infrastructure configuration to assure that the infrastructure provides the Compliance Analyzer with all necessary information. For this purpose a system of policies expressed in formal language was developed. The formal language was selected and extended for further interpretation into the configuration language readable by the infrastructure that can execute the necessary changes in system configuration automatically.
Methodology
Description of Compliance Analyzer was the input for development of this compliance infrastructure component. The task was formulation of assessment policy based on formal languages and exploration of its usability for technical realization of the Compliance Analyzer.
Methods for target process design and simulation
Methodology for business process analysis and control process design enabling the compliance assurance using compliance infrastructure is based on existing modeling and analytical tools and procedures that we identified as the most suitable for compliance assurance purposes. It conforms to the process management approach published by Voříšek (Voříšek J. et al, 2008) . The business process modeled together with designed controls was named target process (Sanna, Marino, Potral, Hall, Bastos-Rodriguez, Soria-Rodriguez, Sobota, Miksu & Asnar. 2009 ).
The BPMN 2.0 (Business Process Modeling Notation) modeling notation (OMG, 2009) was selected to enable the easiest way of target process simulation in testing environments.
BPMN models are understandable for risk consultants, process analysts and business processes' owners who are not technically skilled in SW development. On the same time the BPMN model contains all the information necessary for design and development of all requisite supporting IT services. Fig.2 represents a BPMN model of the business process for HSR single domain case study one of the two verifying compliance infrastructure and methodology. The following Fig. 3 depicts the same process with control process implemented for realization of "on time delivery" regulatory requirement, i.e. it is the target process.
These BPMN models are included in this paper for explanation of the compliance assurance context. Further in this paper these figures are used for explanation of the compliance assurance procedures. The detailed description of the business process is published in Sanna et al. (2009) and the procedure of target process design is described later in this paper.
Methods and procedures for compliance assurance
For design of methodology and development of infrastructure for compliance assurance in an automated way is always necessary to analyze the business process and define the compliance requirements. This is a complex task in deep described in Karjoth et al. (2011 Karjoth et al. ( , 2011 as well as in Fanta et al. (2009) .
The inherent inputs for compliance analysis are:
 Business process model in BPMN and its description.
 Description of the control that is required to be implemented (output of the risk analysis).
 Design of the control process that represents the realization of the respective control (together with the business process it represents the target process).
 Key Assurance Indicator and Key Security Indicator definition.
The Key Assurance Indicator (KAI) and Key Security Indicator (KSI) were introduced as a new type of metrics representing the outputs of target process monitoring and measuring. KAI represents the rate of the compliance of a particular process with respective requirements, either regulatory one, or a requirement derived from the outputs of the risk analysis of that business process. The value of KAI is computed from the results of Compliance Analyzer that compares each process instance flow with the compliance assessment policy. The KAI is defined as a ratio of compliant instances from the total number of target process instances. The indicators are described in detail by Julisch et al. (2010) and Karjoth et al. (2011 Karjoth et al. ( , 2011 .
Based on the target process analysis the set of policies expressed in formal languages must be formulated. These policies then must be transformed to configuration languages readable for the respective components of compliance infrastructure, i.e. signaling policy by the signaling infrastructure, monitoring policy by the monitoring infrastructure, enforcement policy by the enforcement infrastructure, and the assessment policy by the Compliance Analyzer.
It is important to assure that all these policies must be mutually harmonized resp. consistent at every moment. Only then the signaling and monitoring infrastructures can provide inherent information for the enforcement infrastructure and for the compliance assessment components. To assure this policies harmonization a special component called Policy Deployment Component (PDC) was added to compliance infrastructure.
The Compliance Analyzer (CA) is a diagnostic part of compliance infrastructure. For the proper compliance assessment the CA needs the information about the process instance course that can be compared with the assessment policy. For this purpose the ETL (Extract-Transform-Load) component takes over the "event logs", i.e. the track records about the process events captured on the ESB by the signaling and monitoring infrastructure. ETL transforms these records to the form that can be further used in the diagnostic infrastructure and by the CA which finally stores them to the Data Warehouse.
The CA uses the compliance algorithm to compare the track records of the process instance loaded from Data Warehouse with the respective actual version of the assessment policy gained from Policy Deployment Component. The result predicate of the instance compliance (compliant -true/ not compliant -false) returns the value to the respective process instance record to the Data Warehouse as a new data item. This information is later used for the consequential KAI calculation by the diagnostic infrastructure.
Assessment policy language method decision
There were two conceptually different approaches to the assessment policy definition considered from the applicability point of view. In the beginning the approach based on formulation of so called ideal process prevailed. The ideal process was defined as a set of all possible paths of the target process that are considered to be compliant with the respective requirement. This original approach together with the formal language M-calculus considered to be used for description of the ideal process was described in detail by Sinclair (Neuhaus & Gallego-Nicasio-Crespo, 2009 ).
The second possibility of assessment policy formulation was definition of set of constraints. This approach revealed to be viable. There were several reasons why the concept of ideal process was abandoned. One of them was the ambiguity of determining of the exact process trajectory with respect to the ideal process trajectories. Also in many cases the set of possible process instance trajectories is infinite. Another motivation for the concept based on constraints was its much more effective technical realization.
For the definition of the process constraints resp. assessment policy formulation a part of the PSL (Property Specification Language) formal language was selected. The author used one of the reference manuals of PSL language (Accellera, 2004).
Assessment policy in PSL
Originally the author aimed at developing a general compliance assessment algorithm that could evaluate the compliance against any assessment policy defined in PSL. However this extent of generalization hasn't been achieved. Therefore the author decided to proceed from factual to general, and to design the algorithms as a set of PSL expressions for particular constraints and for particular target processes.
With respect to the need for policies harmonization any general compliance assessment algorithm isn't necessary, because each particular target process instance track record and respectively the signaling and monitoring policies must correspond to the actual version of the compliance assessment policy.
Property Specification Language
PSL is a formal language for formal description of system properties. Originally it was designed for verification of the properties of the electronic circuits at the hardware development. Later this formal language spread to other areas. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) used the PSL as a basis for the IEEE 1850 standard designated for system properties description.
PSL is a powerful tool for system's functionality verification based on predicates expressing the required behavior of the systems including requirements expressed with linear temporal logic (LTL). Using PSL we can define requirements on the order of particular activities, set certain time limits between two different activities etc. When we express the requirements on the target process in the form of PSL predicates then we can compare these requirements with the real track records of the target process instances and assess whether the requirements were met for each particular instance.
Sinclair (Neuhaus & Gallego-Nicasio-Crespo, 2009 ) introduced the basic considerations about PSL application for compliance assessment. The author used this concept and enhanced it with own finding from studying the PSL reference manual (Accellera, 2004) .
Among others, the PSL uses the following two preposition operators: X (next) and U (until).
Then there is defined the operator ⊧ explained as follows:
M,s ⊧ f in human language means: function f is valid in any state of the system M. Let φ, φ1 and φ2 are formulas expressing LTL and let σ:= s0, s1, s2,... represents a model of a system composed of an infinite sequence where each si represents a state of the system.
Then the following applies:
σ ⊧ Xφ if and only if (iff) s1 exists and s1 ⊧ φ,
σ ⊧ φ1Uφ2 if σ ⊧ φ2 or (∃k > 0) such as sk ⊧ φ2 and (∀i :
In human language: Xφ is valid in the actual state of the system if and only if φ is valid in the subsequent state of the system. The second statement means that φ1Uφ2 is valid in the actual state of the system if φ2 is valid in each state of the system or if φ2 is valid in all states subsequent to the state when φ1 was valid.
According to Sinclair (Neuhaus & Gallego-Nicasio-Crespo, 2009 ) rather than X and U operators the derived operators F and G are used. Fφ is an abbreviation of ⊤Uφ expression. If the operator T represents validity in each state then ⊤Uφ means validity for each state for any sequence that satisfies (∃k > 0) sk ⊧ φ.
Fφ can be interpreted as "Eventually φ". If the formula φ must be valid for each state of the system σ, then there must exist an expression for the case when φ is never valid, i.e. ¬φ. The expression Gφ "Always φ" then equals to the expression ¬F¬φ.
PSL disposes with quite large nomenclature. The reference manual describes all language layers, i.e. the layer of Boolean type logical expressions, the LTL expressions and the modeling and verification layers.
For the assessment policy description using PSL based predicates only some of these language expressions were used. Besides the basic ones as described above also the LTL expressions of PSL were selected, especially the expressions "Before", "Within" and "After". All these expressions are related to the time interval [T1, T2], where T1 and T2 represent a start and the end of a time interval. They can express an exact time (absolutely) or be related to certain event (relatively). The occurrence of events in the required time interval then can be expressed as shown in the following examples:
Event1 Within [10, 20] 
Event1 Before [Event2,Event3]
Let's have an example of time related requirement in PSL. Let A. B and C are events monitored over a target process. The compliance assessment policy expresses that if event B preceded to event A then event C must occur within time interval between T1 and T2. The PSL expression for this requirement will be:
In the following section the examples of compliance assessment policies expressed in PSL designed by the author are presented. For these purposes a selection of relevant expressions and predicates in PSL was used for PSL usability verification within the pilot use cases.
Compliance Algorithms Design
The author used the special Protection and Regulatory Specification Language (PRM) that is described in detail by Sinclair (Neuhaus, Gallego-Nicasio-Crespo, 2009) . It is based on the requirements on the target process definitions expressed in the PSL as explained in the previous subsections of this document.
The compliance algorithm is composed of three steps: i. Retrieve the target process instance trace record from Datawarehouse. The record includes ID of the process, ID of the process instance and a sequence of the recorded events with their attributes. ii. Retrieve the actual version of the assessment policy in PSL from the Policy Deployment Component. (Note: in the technical realization the policy is distributed by PDC in responding XML format. The SSD scheme in the header contains the ID of the respective process to avoid the fail of compliance analysis caused by using incorrect policy that wouldn't correspond with the target process instance record retrieved from the Datawarehouse). iii. Compare the target process instance trace record with the corresponding policy. If the trace record conforms to the policy predicate then the algorithm returns true, otherwise it returns false.
The result produced by the compliance algorithm for particular target process instance is in the technical realization of the Compliance Analyser recorded to the Datawarehouse as a new data item of the respective trace record. It is subsequently used by the diagnostic infrastructure for KAI calculation for the respective target process within certain time interval. The diagnostic infrastructure is described in detail by Giacomo et al. (2009) .
Compliance Building Blocks for HSR Case Study
File F process in Hospital San Raffaele (HSR) is one of the two case studies used for verification of compliance analysis, enforcement and assessment methodology. In this section the approach to achievement, assessment and assurance of compliance to selected control objective within a specific part of this business process is demonstrated. The introductory analysis of this case study used and further elaborated in this document is described by Sanna et al. (2009) .
Control process represents a realization of a particular control activity (resp. control). Before we can start design of the control process the analysts have to identify all possible control objectives based on the regulatory requirements analysis and risks analysis. The control objectives are usually met by implementation of a set of control activities as described in brief by (Fanta et al. 2009 ). The output of this identification and analysis process is a set of control activities selected for implementation.
Let's consider following two examples of control objectives and related control activities resp. control processes for the File F Drug Dispensation process. The first of them is related to the Separation of Duties (SoD) objective that prevents fraud or misuse of the prescribed drugs. The other example is implementation of a control assuring timely delivery of so called Drug Personalized Kit (DPK) provided by a third party.
Case Study -Single Domain Example

Business Process for HSR Single Domain Example
File F is a regional law regulating the reimbursement of selected drugs distribution in Lombardy Region of Italy. Besides other provisions this law constitutes the duty of the hospital to anonymize the name of a patient in the hospital's application for drugs reimbursement sent monthly to the Lombardy Region if the person has expressed the requirement for anonymization in a written form at dispensation. In addition to this patient's personal data protection it also sets other requirements on the healthcare organizations. HSR designed and introduced the entire process beginning with drug prescription followed by drug dispensation and ended by reimbursement application.
For demonstration purposes we selected a part of the entire File F process called Drug Dispensation sub-process. The BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation) model of Drug Dispensation business process is displayed in the Fig.2 . Here the original business process before the control activities are implemented is illustrated. This model doesn't depict all the activities and nuances of the File F process, because conceiving the entire complexity would be counterproductive and would make the example unintelligible. This subprocess described and used for demonstration of compliance achievement and assessment in this subsection is limited to the single domain situation in spite of the second example of HSR Case Study focused on the multi domain arrangement of the business process.
Fig. 2: BPMN model of the business process for HSR single domain example, source author
Process Actors
In the process we identified three pools: HSR Ward, Patient and HSR IT Service. The core activities are performed within Patient and HSR Ward pools. There is one actor in the Patient pool, i.e. Patient, and there are two actors in the HSR Ward pool: a doctor and/or a nurse. In general doctor and nurse are different roles and their roles hold different authorizations for particular actions in this process. For instance a nurse is not authorized to prescribe a drug, however s/he is allowed to change a prescription in certain and precisely defined cases and items like change of used packing of the prescribed medicine or supporting medium like infusion solution in accordance with the packing availability in the drug stock. A nurse is not allowed to change dosing of the prescribed medicine. In this example we take into account only those aspects of authorization significant for SoD control activity implementation.
Business Process Flow
In the example shown in the Fig. 2 the process model starts with the moment when a patient comes to the hospital ward to obtain the previously prescribed medicine. A doctor or a nurse takes the prescription sheet from the patient and retrieves the prescription data from the information system. After that s/he registers the request for dispensation, collects the drugs from the ward drug stock and prints the dispensation sheet. Then s/he gives the dispensation sheet to be signed by the patient. In the end the doctor or the nurse delivers the drugs and archives the dispensation sheet and the respective part of File F process terminates.
Business Process Artifacts
The key artifacts in this example are prescription data and dispensation data that include the information about the actor ID for each of these activities. This information is crucial for further evaluation of the process instance flow in order to assess whether it run in compliance with the assessment policy requirements.
SoD Control Activity Implementation
In the file F process HSR manages deliveries of expensive and/or special medicines whose distribution is regulated by File F law. The goal of File F process management is 100% reimbursement of all these drugs prescribed and dispensed by HSR wards. One of the risks identified in relation to this goal is fraud or misuse of the drugs by ward personnel. The aim of SoD (i.e. Separation or Segregation of Duties) control implementation is prevention of the situation when drugs are prescribed and at the same time dispensed by one person. This control implements so called four eyes principle when one person of the ward personnel prescribes the drugs and another one then performs the drag dispensation within one process instance.
Such a simple implementation of SoD control might cause serious problems to the hospital ward and threaten achievement one of the business purposes of this process, i.e. quality of the health care and provision of the care to the patient when s/he needs it. This situation occurs when there is only one physician authorized for prescription and dispensation for example during night service or weekend service.
The hospital can't keep double status of ward personnel only for this control purposes because such control implementation would be not acceptably expensive. For this reason the implementation of SoD control activity had to be modified. Therefore the final design of the control process includes the provision for cases when prescriptor and dispenser must be physically one and the same person. In this situation the dispenser is forced to write a reasoning why s/he prescribed and dispensed at the same time in one process instance. This reasoning is automatically sent to the ward's manager who is then obliged to check the reasons and to take corrective actions if something suspicious occurs.
In the case of Separation of Duties the name of the control objective and control activity is the same "Separation of Duties", which conforms to the analogous terminology introduced for instance by CoBIT.
Target Process
The target process represents business process together with control process implementation. The BPMN model of the target process for HSR single domain example is displayed in the Fig. 5 . The new pool called control process was added with the new actor supervisor.
The control process in this case is semi-automated. First manual activity is the "Justify the SoD violation" task assigned to the drug dispenser, the second is supervisor's personal check of all received justifications as well as the notifications of the delayed justifications.
In this example the implementation of the control process doesn't influence the flow of the original business process. This control process only deploys the data produced and events emitted out from the business process. It also adds one task to the dispenser (i.e. writing the justification in the case of the SoD violation).
Indicators
The Key Security Indicator for assessment of correctness of the control process (KSI-correctness) was designed as a percentage of instances when the request for justification was issued versus the number of instances when the IDs of prescriptor and dispenser were identical.
The Key Security Indicator for assessment of the ratio of the target process instances where the corrective or informative activity of the control process has to take place (KSI-coverage) was designed as the percentage of the instances when the control process checked the IDs of dispenser and prescriptor vs. the number of all instances.
The Key Assurance Indicator measures the level of achieved compliance with the respective particular control objective resp. the extent to which the target process comply with the requirements expressed by the assessment policy. Percentage of the target process instances when the ID of prescriptor and dispenser was identical and at the same instance the justification hasn't been received by the supervisor.
Tab. 1: SoD control implementation and assessment overview for HSR case study, source author
Risk
Danger of fraud or misusage of the drug by hospital wards personnel performing prescription and dispensation at the same time.
Control Objective Minimize the dispensation by the same person who performed the prescription within the same process instance (Separation of Duties) and justify all cases when the Separation of Duties is not met.
Control Activity
Check whether the dispenser is physically the same person who performed the prescription and if is true then force the dispenser to justify the reason why the dispensation can't be performed by another person authorized for dispensation.
Control Process
Retrieve the dispensation and the prescription data for the respective process instance and compare the IDs of prescriptor and dispenser. If the IDs are equal then send the requirement for justification e-mail and sending it to the supervisor. Check whether the justification was sent within 24 hours after the requirement for justification was sent; otherwise send a notification to the supervisor.
Preconditions
Each user must be correctly authenticated to the IT system in order to be allowed to perform prescription and dispensation.
The hospital's identity management system doesn't allow introducing to the IT system one physical persons multiple times with different IDs. It is assured that two different ID always represent two different people.
Key Security Indicators
KSI-correctness:
Percentage of instances when the request for justification was issued vs. the number of instances when the IDs of prescriptor and dispenser were identical.
KSI-coverage:
Percentage of the instances when the control process checked the IDs of dispenser and prescriptor vs. the number of all instances.
Key Assurance Indicator
Percentage of the target process instances when either the ID of prescriptor and dispenser were different or they were identical and at the same instance the justification was received by the supervisor. 
Assessment policy and compliance analysis
Assessment policy is interpreted as a set of requirements resp. constraints defined for each target process. The assessment policy can be perceived as a very low level and particular process specific "standard" approved by the compliance auditor. If the target process instance runs in accordance with the respective assessment policy it is assumed to be compliant with it. An assessment policy must be formulated in terms of the information that can be retrieved from the target process traces records. The set of assessment policy expressions formulating the respective constraints is used for analysis of each process instance. The target process traces are recorded as a string of events produced by the signaling and monitoring infrastructure implemented in the SOA environment. The event records carry information necessary for the compliance assessment like time of the event or identification (ID) of the actor who performed the respective activity within the target process.
For instance the target process instance in our first example can be interpreted as compliant if the relevant trace either identifies that the dispenser and prescriptor are different persons or they are identical and the justification to the supervisor was sent. The compliance analyzer compares these two constraints with the respective process instance trace record and identifies whether particular instance is compliant or not. In the end the compliance analyzer returns this finding to the assessment infrastructure for Key Assurance Indicator computation and further reporting and assessment.
Assessment policy for Separation of Duties requirement
The author designed the following assessment policy in this use case expressed in PSL:
In this PSL predicate "DrugPrescribed", "DrugDispensed"and JustificationSent" represent the respective events monitored and recorded with the Ti, attributes i.e. the time when the event occurred, and a userIDi attribute that identifies the person who performed the respective activity in this particular target process instance. The Separation of Duties Requirement is satisfied if the prestcription and dispensation activities were performed by persons with two different IDs or, if the IDs were identical and the person who performed the dispensation sent the justification within 24 hours after the dispensation.
Compliance assessment algorithm for Separation of Duties requirement
The compliance assessment algorithm for Separation of Duties requirement assesses the particular target process trace meets the assessment policy set for the respective control. The PSL predicate in this case is the following:
If the condition expressed in PSL predicate entered in the commas 〚PSL〛is satisfied then the result value is true, otherwise it is false.
Case Study -Multiple Trust Domain Example
Business Process for HSR Multiple Trust Domain Example
The case study based on "Personalized drug kit delivery process" was analyzed and desidgned in close cooperation and at instant consultations with qualified HSR personnell in order to achieve close to practice example. Here in this section we concentrate on this business process flow description in the extent necessary for explanation of the following control implementation and compliance assessment presented concept.
Process Actors
The "Personalized drug kit delivery process" model shown on the Fig. 4 presents new actors in comparison with the previous single domain example. In HSR domain the Pharmacy and the new domains of Drug transporter (DT) and Drug Stock Management (DSM) Provider were added. This structure was selected for demonstration of dynamic outsourcing and for iterated outsourcing arrangements. At the dynamic outsourcing the Pharmacy posts enquiries to optional Drug Stock Management Providers, whereas at the iterated outsourcing the Drug Transport Service is delivered by Drug Transporter who is the Drug Stock Management subcontractor.
Business Process Flow
The subject of this process is Drug Personalized Kit (DPK), a specific set of drugs to be dispensed to particular patient. DPK is always requested from the Pharmacy, it can't be delivered from ward stock. Whenever a doctor prescribes PDK the Drug Prescription task issues DPK request for the Pharmacy. Pharmacy receives this request and the process continues in the respective swim lane with the dynamic outsourcing flow. Acceptance of DPK request by the Pharmacy is qualified with its formal correctness and then the DPK Enquiry task starts with sending enquiries to the optional Drug Stock Management Providers.
After the DSM Providers receive the DPK enquiry they start calling their subcontracted Drug Transporters. For the simulation purposes we assume that each DPK Provider subcontracts their separate Drug Transporter. After collecting all information regarding possibility to deliver the DPK on time, the DSM Provider sends the Offer to the Pharmacy. Pharmacy waits for certain time for the offers. After this time limit end the Pharmacy selects the optimal offer and posts the order to the selected DSM Provider.
The DSM Provider prepares the DPK for expedition and orders the transportation. In the end the Drug delivers DPK to the Pharmacy who then forwards it to the appropriate ward stock for dispensation.
Business Process Artifacts
The artifacts essential for the further explained "Timely Delivery of DPK" Control Objective in this business process especially are the "sent order" containing time of the order issue, and the data indicating the time of DPK delivery i.e. "Bill of Delivery". 
Target Process
The control process implemented in this example doesn't require any additional actor. The control process tasks are performed by the actor already existing in the original business process. The Fig. 5 displays the core of the control process implemented in the form of sub-process Check Delivery and take action if necessary (the red sub-process). The DSM Provider is obliged to send a warning if the delivery of DPK is delayed to the Pharmacy. DSM Provider checks the status of the delivery in predefined intervals and in case of any problem notifies the Pharmacy.
On the other hand the implemented control process requires the Pharmacy to check in predefined frequency or at least at certain time before contracted time of delivery, whether the DSM Provider has sent them a delay notification or whether the DPK has already been delivered. If there is a delay announced or if the DPK has already not been delivered on time then they have to take corrective action. In case the DPK can't be from whatever reason delivered by the contracted DSM Provider, the Pharmacy returns to the optional offers and starts ordering to the next DSM Provider in accordance with the prioritization of the offers. This control process doesn't distinguish possible causes of the delay. The DSM Provider is expected to analyze these causes independently on the relations with their customer. 
Indicators
The proper function of the control process can be measured using multiple metrics. One example is the KSI-correctness defined as a ratio of number of traces when the delay occurred and the corrective action was performed to all traces when delay of DPK delivery occurred. Also some particular parts of the control process can be measured. For example, only the correctness of the proper notifications coming from DSM Providers to the Pharmacy, or only the correctness of taking corrective action by the Pharmacy themselves. Measuring of the particular correctness on provides' side of the control process might be used for further assessment of the providers and some kind of rating them. The more correctly they part of control process runs the more trust is perceived with that respective provider.
KSI-coverage indicates the frequency of the traces when any corrective action takes place. In this example the control process should run at every trace, because every time the Pharmacy is obliged to check the situation. It also makes sense to measure the ratio of the traces when the Pharmacy hasn't control whether any delay is probable. In this example we suggest calculation of the ratio of the traces when any control action was taken to all traces.
The calculation of Key Assurance Indicator flags all traces when the control process fails in the case when the non-controlled process comes to state when the corrective action is necessary. In this example we can calculate the total number of delayed deliveries of DPK to the total number of traces. 
Control Process
The DSM Provider is obliged to send a warning if the delivery of DPK is delayed. DSM Provider has to check the status of the delivery in predefined intervals.
The Pharmacy is obliged to check in predefined interval before contracted time of delivery, whether the DSM Provider has sent them a delay notification or whether the DPK has already been delivered. If there is a delay announced or if the DPK is not delivered on time then they have to take corrective action. In case the DPK can't be delivered from whatever reason by the contracted DSM Provider, the Pharmacy returns to the optional offers and starts ordering to the next DSM Provider in accordance with the prioritization of the offers.
Preconditions
The time stamp records of the DPK order and DPK delivery are reliable.
Key Security Indicators KSI-correctness:
The ratio of the traces when the delay occurred and the corrective action was performed to all traces when delay of DPK delivery occurred.
KSI-coverage:
The ration of the traces when any control action was taken to all traces.
Key Assurance Indicator
The ratio of the number of traces when DPK is delivered on time to all process traces.
Assessment policy and compliance analysis
The constraint of the assessment policy is expressed by requirement on not exceeding certain time period or requirements on certain time differences in general. In order to be able to assess the compliance of particular traces in this example for KAI calculation the system must provide exact information on the time when particular events occurred. The compliance algorithms for such cases represent a set of compartments of the measured times with the absolute or relative time limits.
Assessment policy for timely delivery requirement
The author designed the following assessment policy in this use case expressed in PSL: 
Here "DPKOrdered" represents the event of sending an order of DPK with the attribute indicating the time when this event occurred. "DPKReceived" analogously represents the event when the DPK was delivered to the hospital. This policy says that compliant process instance is the instance of the target process where the time limit of 3 days for DPK delivery was met or if the delivery wasn't on time then there the delivery was checked within the interval one day after the order had been sent and not later that one day before the expected time of DPK delivery.
